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Allow ML-DSA module signing to be enabled. Note that OpenSSL's CMS_*() function suite does not, as of OpenSSL-3.6, support the use of CMS_NOATTR with ML-DSA, so the prohibition against using signedAttrs with module signing has to be removed. The selected digest then applies only to the algorithm used to calculate the digest stored in the messageDigest attribute. The OpenSSL development branch has patches applied that fix this[1], but it appears that that will only be available in OpenSSL-4. [1] https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/28923 sign-file won't set CMS_NOATTR if openssl is earlier than v4, resulting in the use of signed attributes. The ML-DSA algorithm takes the raw data to be signed without regard to what digest algorithm is specified in the CMS message. The CMS specified digest algorithm is ignored unless signedAttrs are used; in such a case, only SHA512 is permitted. Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> cc: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org> cc: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@kernel.org> cc: Lukas Wunner <lukas@wunner.de> cc: Ignat Korchagin <ignat@cloudflare.com> cc: Stephan Mueller <smueller@chronox.de> cc: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au> cc: keyrings@vger.kernel.org cc: linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org
197 lines
7.6 KiB
Text
197 lines
7.6 KiB
Text
# SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
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menu "Certificates for signature checking"
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config MODULE_SIG_KEY
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string "File name or PKCS#11 URI of module signing key"
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default "certs/signing_key.pem"
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depends on MODULE_SIG || (IMA_APPRAISE_MODSIG && MODULES)
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help
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Provide the file name of a private key/certificate in PEM format,
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or a PKCS#11 URI according to RFC7512. The file should contain, or
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the URI should identify, both the certificate and its corresponding
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private key.
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If this option is unchanged from its default "certs/signing_key.pem",
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then the kernel will automatically generate the private key and
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certificate as described in Documentation/admin-guide/module-signing.rst
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choice
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prompt "Type of module signing key to be generated"
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depends on MODULE_SIG || (IMA_APPRAISE_MODSIG && MODULES)
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help
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The type of module signing key type to generate. This option
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does not apply if a #PKCS11 URI is used.
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config MODULE_SIG_KEY_TYPE_RSA
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bool "RSA"
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help
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Use an RSA key for module signing.
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config MODULE_SIG_KEY_TYPE_ECDSA
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bool "ECDSA"
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select CRYPTO_ECDSA
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depends on !(MODULE_SIG_SHA256 || MODULE_SIG_SHA3_256)
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help
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Use an elliptic curve key (NIST P384) for module signing. Use
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a strong hash of same or higher bit length, i.e. sha384 or
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sha512 for hashing modules.
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Note: Remove all ECDSA signing keys, e.g. certs/signing_key.pem,
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when falling back to building Linux 5.14 and older kernels.
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config MODULE_SIG_KEY_TYPE_MLDSA_44
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bool "ML-DSA-44"
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select CRYPTO_MLDSA
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depends on OPENSSL_SUPPORTS_ML_DSA
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help
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Use an ML-DSA-44 key (NIST FIPS 204) for module signing. ML-DSA
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support requires OpenSSL-3.5 minimum; preferably OpenSSL-4+. With
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the latter, the entire module body will be signed; with the former,
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signedAttrs will be used as it lacks support for CMS_NOATTR with
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ML-DSA.
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config MODULE_SIG_KEY_TYPE_MLDSA_65
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bool "ML-DSA-65"
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select CRYPTO_MLDSA
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depends on OPENSSL_SUPPORTS_ML_DSA
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help
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Use an ML-DSA-65 key (NIST FIPS 204) for module signing. ML-DSA
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support requires OpenSSL-3.5 minimum; preferably OpenSSL-4+. With
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the latter, the entire module body will be signed; with the former,
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signedAttrs will be used as it lacks support for CMS_NOATTR with
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ML-DSA.
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config MODULE_SIG_KEY_TYPE_MLDSA_87
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bool "ML-DSA-87"
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select CRYPTO_MLDSA
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depends on OPENSSL_SUPPORTS_ML_DSA
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help
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Use an ML-DSA-87 key (NIST FIPS 204) for module signing. ML-DSA
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support requires OpenSSL-3.5 minimum; preferably OpenSSL-4+. With
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the latter, the entire module body will be signed; with the former,
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signedAttrs will be used as it lacks support for CMS_NOATTR with
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ML-DSA.
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endchoice
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config SYSTEM_TRUSTED_KEYRING
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bool "Provide system-wide ring of trusted keys"
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depends on KEYS
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depends on ASYMMETRIC_KEY_TYPE
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depends on X509_CERTIFICATE_PARSER = y
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help
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Provide a system keyring to which trusted keys can be added. Keys in
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the keyring are considered to be trusted. Keys may be added at will
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by the kernel from compiled-in data and from hardware key stores, but
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userspace may only add extra keys if those keys can be verified by
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keys already in the keyring.
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Keys in this keyring are used by module signature checking.
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config SYSTEM_TRUSTED_KEYS
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string "Additional X.509 keys for default system keyring"
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depends on SYSTEM_TRUSTED_KEYRING
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help
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If set, this option should be the filename of a PEM-formatted file
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containing trusted X.509 certificates to be included in the default
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system keyring. Any certificate used for module signing is implicitly
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also trusted.
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NOTE: If you previously provided keys for the system keyring in the
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form of DER-encoded *.x509 files in the top-level build directory,
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those are no longer used. You will need to set this option instead.
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config SYSTEM_EXTRA_CERTIFICATE
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bool "Reserve area for inserting a certificate without recompiling"
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depends on SYSTEM_TRUSTED_KEYRING
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help
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If set, space for an extra certificate will be reserved in the kernel
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image. This allows introducing a trusted certificate to the default
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system keyring without recompiling the kernel.
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config SYSTEM_EXTRA_CERTIFICATE_SIZE
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int "Number of bytes to reserve for the extra certificate"
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depends on SYSTEM_EXTRA_CERTIFICATE
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default 4096
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help
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This is the number of bytes reserved in the kernel image for a
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certificate to be inserted.
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config SECONDARY_TRUSTED_KEYRING
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bool "Provide a keyring to which extra trustable keys may be added"
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depends on SYSTEM_TRUSTED_KEYRING
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help
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If set, provide a keyring to which extra keys may be added, provided
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those keys are not blacklisted and are vouched for by a key built
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into the kernel, machine keyring (if configured), or already in the
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secondary trusted keyring.
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config SECONDARY_TRUSTED_KEYRING_SIGNED_BY_BUILTIN
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bool "Only allow additional certs signed by keys on the builtin trusted keyring"
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depends on SECONDARY_TRUSTED_KEYRING
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help
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If set, only certificates signed by keys on the builtin trusted
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keyring may be loaded onto the secondary trusted keyring.
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Note: The machine keyring, if configured, will be linked to the
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secondary keyring. When enabling this option, it is recommended
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to also configure INTEGRITY_CA_MACHINE_KEYRING_MAX to prevent
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linking code signing keys with imputed trust to the secondary
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trusted keyring.
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config SYSTEM_BLACKLIST_KEYRING
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bool "Provide system-wide ring of blacklisted keys"
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depends on KEYS
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help
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Provide a system keyring to which blacklisted keys can be added.
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Keys in the keyring are considered entirely untrusted. Keys in this
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keyring are used by the module signature checking to reject loading
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of modules signed with a blacklisted key.
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config SYSTEM_BLACKLIST_HASH_LIST
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string "Hashes to be preloaded into the system blacklist keyring"
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depends on SYSTEM_BLACKLIST_KEYRING
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help
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If set, this option should be the filename of a list of hashes in the
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form "<hash>", "<hash>", ... . This will be included into a C
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wrapper to incorporate the list into the kernel. Each <hash> must be a
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string starting with a prefix ("tbs" or "bin"), then a colon (":"), and
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finally an even number of hexadecimal lowercase characters (up to 128).
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Certificate hashes can be generated with
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tools/certs/print-cert-tbs-hash.sh .
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config SYSTEM_REVOCATION_LIST
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bool "Provide system-wide ring of revocation certificates"
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depends on SYSTEM_BLACKLIST_KEYRING
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depends on PKCS7_MESSAGE_PARSER=y
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help
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If set, this allows revocation certificates to be stored in the
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blacklist keyring and implements a hook whereby a PKCS#7 message can
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be checked to see if it matches such a certificate.
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config SYSTEM_REVOCATION_KEYS
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string "X.509 certificates to be preloaded into the system blacklist keyring"
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depends on SYSTEM_REVOCATION_LIST
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help
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If set, this option should be the filename of a PEM-formatted file
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containing X.509 certificates to be included in the default blacklist
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keyring.
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config SYSTEM_BLACKLIST_AUTH_UPDATE
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bool "Allow root to add signed blacklist keys"
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depends on SYSTEM_BLACKLIST_KEYRING
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depends on SYSTEM_DATA_VERIFICATION
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help
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If set, provide the ability to load new blacklist keys at run time if
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they are signed and vouched by a certificate from the builtin trusted
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keyring. The PKCS#7 signature of the description is set in the key
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payload. Blacklist keys cannot be removed.
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config OPENSSL_SUPPORTS_ML_DSA
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def_bool $(success, openssl list -key-managers | grep -q ML-DSA-87)
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help
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Support for ML-DSA-44/65/87 was added in openssl-3.5, so as long
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as older versions are supported, the key types may only be
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set after testing the installed binary for support.
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endmenu
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