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5473a722f7
BPF token support was introduced to allow a privileged process to delegate limited BPF functionality—such as map creation and program loading—to an unprivileged process: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-security-module/20231130185229.2688956-1-andrii@kernel.org/ This patch adds SELinux support for controlling BPF token access. With this change, SELinux policies can now enforce constraints on BPF token usage based on both the delegating (privileged) process and the recipient (unprivileged) process. Supported operations currently include: - map_create - prog_load High-level workflow: 1. An unprivileged process creates a VFS context via `fsopen()` and obtains a file descriptor. 2. This descriptor is passed to a privileged process, which configures BPF token delegation options and mounts a BPF filesystem. 3. SELinux records the `creator_sid` of the privileged process during mount setup. 4. The unprivileged process then uses this BPF fs mount to create a token and attach it to subsequent BPF syscalls. 5. During verification of `map_create` and `prog_load`, SELinux uses `creator_sid` and the current SID to check policy permissions via: avc_has_perm(creator_sid, current_sid, SECCLASS_BPF, BPF__MAP_CREATE, NULL); The implementation introduces two new permissions: - map_create_as - prog_load_as At token creation time, SELinux verifies that the current process has the appropriate `*_as` permission (depending on the `allowed_cmds` value in the bpf_token) to act on behalf of the `creator_sid`. Example SELinux policy: allow test_bpf_t self:bpf { map_create map_read map_write prog_load prog_run map_create_as prog_load_as }; Additionally, a new policy capability bpf_token_perms is added to ensure backward compatibility. If disabled, previous behavior ((checks based on current process SID)) is preserved. Signed-off-by: Eric Suen <ericsu@linux.microsoft.com> Tested-by: Daniel Durning <danieldurning.work@gmail.com> Reviewed-by: Daniel Durning <danieldurning.work@gmail.com> [PM: merge fuzz, subject tweaks, whitespace tweaks, line length tweaks] Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com> |
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| .. | ||
| audit.h | ||
| avc.h | ||
| avc_ss.h | ||
| classmap.h | ||
| conditional.h | ||
| hash.h | ||
| ibpkey.h | ||
| ima.h | ||
| initcalls.h | ||
| initial_sid_to_string.h | ||
| netif.h | ||
| netlabel.h | ||
| netnode.h | ||
| netport.h | ||
| objsec.h | ||
| policycap.h | ||
| policycap_names.h | ||
| security.h | ||
| xfrm.h | ||