linux/net/ceph/crypto.c
Linus Torvalds bf4afc53b7 Convert 'alloc_obj' family to use the new default GFP_KERNEL argument
This was done entirely with mindless brute force, using

    git grep -l '\<k[vmz]*alloc_objs*(.*, GFP_KERNEL)' |
        xargs sed -i 's/\(alloc_objs*(.*\), GFP_KERNEL)/\1)/'

to convert the new alloc_obj() users that had a simple GFP_KERNEL
argument to just drop that argument.

Note that due to the extreme simplicity of the scripting, any slightly
more complex cases spread over multiple lines would not be triggered:
they definitely exist, but this covers the vast bulk of the cases, and
the resulting diff is also then easier to check automatically.

For the same reason the 'flex' versions will be done as a separate
conversion.

Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
2026-02-21 17:09:51 -08:00

520 lines
12 KiB
C

// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
#include <linux/ceph/ceph_debug.h>
#include <linux/err.h>
#include <linux/scatterlist.h>
#include <linux/sched.h>
#include <linux/slab.h>
#include <crypto/aes.h>
#include <crypto/krb5.h>
#include <crypto/skcipher.h>
#include <linux/key-type.h>
#include <linux/sched/mm.h>
#include <keys/ceph-type.h>
#include <keys/user-type.h>
#include <linux/ceph/decode.h>
#include "crypto.h"
static int set_aes_tfm(struct ceph_crypto_key *key)
{
unsigned int noio_flag;
int ret;
noio_flag = memalloc_noio_save();
key->aes_tfm = crypto_alloc_sync_skcipher("cbc(aes)", 0, 0);
memalloc_noio_restore(noio_flag);
if (IS_ERR(key->aes_tfm)) {
ret = PTR_ERR(key->aes_tfm);
key->aes_tfm = NULL;
return ret;
}
ret = crypto_sync_skcipher_setkey(key->aes_tfm, key->key, key->len);
if (ret)
return ret;
return 0;
}
static int set_krb5_tfms(struct ceph_crypto_key *key, const u32 *key_usages,
int key_usage_cnt)
{
struct krb5_buffer TK = { .len = key->len, .data = key->key };
unsigned int noio_flag;
int ret = 0;
int i;
if (WARN_ON_ONCE(key_usage_cnt > ARRAY_SIZE(key->krb5_tfms)))
return -EINVAL;
key->krb5_type = crypto_krb5_find_enctype(
KRB5_ENCTYPE_AES256_CTS_HMAC_SHA384_192);
if (!key->krb5_type)
return -ENOPKG;
/*
* Despite crypto_krb5_prepare_encryption() taking a gfp mask,
* crypto_alloc_aead() inside of it allocates with GFP_KERNEL.
*/
noio_flag = memalloc_noio_save();
for (i = 0; i < key_usage_cnt; i++) {
key->krb5_tfms[i] = crypto_krb5_prepare_encryption(
key->krb5_type, &TK, key_usages[i],
GFP_NOIO);
if (IS_ERR(key->krb5_tfms[i])) {
ret = PTR_ERR(key->krb5_tfms[i]);
key->krb5_tfms[i] = NULL;
goto out_flag;
}
}
out_flag:
memalloc_noio_restore(noio_flag);
return ret;
}
int ceph_crypto_key_prepare(struct ceph_crypto_key *key,
const u32 *key_usages, int key_usage_cnt)
{
switch (key->type) {
case CEPH_CRYPTO_NONE:
return 0; /* nothing to do */
case CEPH_CRYPTO_AES:
return set_aes_tfm(key);
case CEPH_CRYPTO_AES256KRB5:
hmac_sha256_preparekey(&key->hmac_key, key->key, key->len);
return set_krb5_tfms(key, key_usages, key_usage_cnt);
default:
return -ENOTSUPP;
}
}
/*
* @dst should be zeroed before this function is called.
*/
int ceph_crypto_key_clone(struct ceph_crypto_key *dst,
const struct ceph_crypto_key *src)
{
dst->type = src->type;
dst->created = src->created;
dst->len = src->len;
dst->key = kmemdup(src->key, src->len, GFP_NOIO);
if (!dst->key)
return -ENOMEM;
return 0;
}
/*
* @key should be zeroed before this function is called.
*/
int ceph_crypto_key_decode(struct ceph_crypto_key *key, void **p, void *end)
{
ceph_decode_need(p, end, 2*sizeof(u16) + sizeof(key->created), bad);
key->type = ceph_decode_16(p);
ceph_decode_copy(p, &key->created, sizeof(key->created));
key->len = ceph_decode_16(p);
ceph_decode_need(p, end, key->len, bad);
if (key->len > CEPH_MAX_KEY_LEN) {
pr_err("secret too big %d\n", key->len);
return -EINVAL;
}
key->key = kmemdup(*p, key->len, GFP_NOIO);
if (!key->key)
return -ENOMEM;
memzero_explicit(*p, key->len);
*p += key->len;
return 0;
bad:
dout("failed to decode crypto key\n");
return -EINVAL;
}
int ceph_crypto_key_unarmor(struct ceph_crypto_key *key, const char *inkey)
{
int inlen = strlen(inkey);
int blen = inlen * 3 / 4;
void *buf, *p;
int ret;
dout("crypto_key_unarmor %s\n", inkey);
buf = kmalloc(blen, GFP_NOFS);
if (!buf)
return -ENOMEM;
blen = ceph_unarmor(buf, inkey, inkey+inlen);
if (blen < 0) {
kfree(buf);
return blen;
}
p = buf;
ret = ceph_crypto_key_decode(key, &p, p + blen);
kfree(buf);
if (ret)
return ret;
dout("crypto_key_unarmor key %p type %d len %d\n", key,
key->type, key->len);
return 0;
}
void ceph_crypto_key_destroy(struct ceph_crypto_key *key)
{
int i;
if (!key)
return;
kfree_sensitive(key->key);
key->key = NULL;
if (key->type == CEPH_CRYPTO_AES) {
if (key->aes_tfm) {
crypto_free_sync_skcipher(key->aes_tfm);
key->aes_tfm = NULL;
}
} else if (key->type == CEPH_CRYPTO_AES256KRB5) {
memzero_explicit(&key->hmac_key, sizeof(key->hmac_key));
for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(key->krb5_tfms); i++) {
if (key->krb5_tfms[i]) {
crypto_free_aead(key->krb5_tfms[i]);
key->krb5_tfms[i] = NULL;
}
}
}
}
static const u8 *aes_iv = (u8 *)CEPH_AES_IV;
/*
* Should be used for buffers allocated with kvmalloc().
* Currently these are encrypt out-buffer (ceph_buffer) and decrypt
* in-buffer (msg front).
*
* Dispose of @sgt with teardown_sgtable().
*
* @prealloc_sg is to avoid memory allocation inside sg_alloc_table()
* in cases where a single sg is sufficient. No attempt to reduce the
* number of sgs by squeezing physically contiguous pages together is
* made though, for simplicity.
*/
static int setup_sgtable(struct sg_table *sgt, struct scatterlist *prealloc_sg,
const void *buf, unsigned int buf_len)
{
struct scatterlist *sg;
const bool is_vmalloc = is_vmalloc_addr(buf);
unsigned int off = offset_in_page(buf);
unsigned int chunk_cnt = 1;
unsigned int chunk_len = PAGE_ALIGN(off + buf_len);
int i;
int ret;
if (buf_len == 0) {
memset(sgt, 0, sizeof(*sgt));
return -EINVAL;
}
if (is_vmalloc) {
chunk_cnt = chunk_len >> PAGE_SHIFT;
chunk_len = PAGE_SIZE;
}
if (chunk_cnt > 1) {
ret = sg_alloc_table(sgt, chunk_cnt, GFP_NOFS);
if (ret)
return ret;
} else {
WARN_ON(chunk_cnt != 1);
sg_init_table(prealloc_sg, 1);
sgt->sgl = prealloc_sg;
sgt->nents = sgt->orig_nents = 1;
}
for_each_sg(sgt->sgl, sg, sgt->orig_nents, i) {
struct page *page;
unsigned int len = min(chunk_len - off, buf_len);
if (is_vmalloc)
page = vmalloc_to_page(buf);
else
page = virt_to_page(buf);
sg_set_page(sg, page, len, off);
off = 0;
buf += len;
buf_len -= len;
}
WARN_ON(buf_len != 0);
return 0;
}
static void teardown_sgtable(struct sg_table *sgt)
{
if (sgt->orig_nents > 1)
sg_free_table(sgt);
}
static int ceph_aes_crypt(const struct ceph_crypto_key *key, bool encrypt,
void *buf, int buf_len, int in_len, int *pout_len)
{
SYNC_SKCIPHER_REQUEST_ON_STACK(req, key->aes_tfm);
struct sg_table sgt;
struct scatterlist prealloc_sg;
char iv[AES_BLOCK_SIZE] __aligned(8);
int pad_byte = AES_BLOCK_SIZE - (in_len & (AES_BLOCK_SIZE - 1));
int crypt_len = encrypt ? in_len + pad_byte : in_len;
int ret;
WARN_ON(crypt_len > buf_len);
if (encrypt)
memset(buf + in_len, pad_byte, pad_byte);
ret = setup_sgtable(&sgt, &prealloc_sg, buf, crypt_len);
if (ret)
return ret;
memcpy(iv, aes_iv, AES_BLOCK_SIZE);
skcipher_request_set_sync_tfm(req, key->aes_tfm);
skcipher_request_set_callback(req, 0, NULL, NULL);
skcipher_request_set_crypt(req, sgt.sgl, sgt.sgl, crypt_len, iv);
/*
print_hex_dump(KERN_ERR, "key: ", DUMP_PREFIX_NONE, 16, 1,
key->key, key->len, 1);
print_hex_dump(KERN_ERR, " in: ", DUMP_PREFIX_NONE, 16, 1,
buf, crypt_len, 1);
*/
if (encrypt)
ret = crypto_skcipher_encrypt(req);
else
ret = crypto_skcipher_decrypt(req);
skcipher_request_zero(req);
if (ret) {
pr_err("%s %scrypt failed: %d\n", __func__,
encrypt ? "en" : "de", ret);
goto out_sgt;
}
/*
print_hex_dump(KERN_ERR, "out: ", DUMP_PREFIX_NONE, 16, 1,
buf, crypt_len, 1);
*/
if (encrypt) {
*pout_len = crypt_len;
} else {
pad_byte = *(char *)(buf + in_len - 1);
if (pad_byte > 0 && pad_byte <= AES_BLOCK_SIZE &&
in_len >= pad_byte) {
*pout_len = in_len - pad_byte;
} else {
pr_err("%s got bad padding %d on in_len %d\n",
__func__, pad_byte, in_len);
ret = -EPERM;
goto out_sgt;
}
}
out_sgt:
teardown_sgtable(&sgt);
return ret;
}
static int ceph_krb5_encrypt(const struct ceph_crypto_key *key, int usage_slot,
void *buf, int buf_len, int in_len, int *pout_len)
{
struct sg_table sgt;
struct scatterlist prealloc_sg;
int ret;
if (WARN_ON_ONCE(usage_slot >= ARRAY_SIZE(key->krb5_tfms)))
return -EINVAL;
ret = setup_sgtable(&sgt, &prealloc_sg, buf, buf_len);
if (ret)
return ret;
ret = crypto_krb5_encrypt(key->krb5_type, key->krb5_tfms[usage_slot],
sgt.sgl, sgt.nents, buf_len, AES_BLOCK_SIZE,
in_len, false);
if (ret < 0) {
pr_err("%s encrypt failed: %d\n", __func__, ret);
goto out_sgt;
}
*pout_len = ret;
ret = 0;
out_sgt:
teardown_sgtable(&sgt);
return ret;
}
static int ceph_krb5_decrypt(const struct ceph_crypto_key *key, int usage_slot,
void *buf, int buf_len, int in_len, int *pout_len)
{
struct sg_table sgt;
struct scatterlist prealloc_sg;
size_t data_off = 0;
size_t data_len = in_len;
int ret;
if (WARN_ON_ONCE(usage_slot >= ARRAY_SIZE(key->krb5_tfms)))
return -EINVAL;
ret = setup_sgtable(&sgt, &prealloc_sg, buf, in_len);
if (ret)
return ret;
ret = crypto_krb5_decrypt(key->krb5_type, key->krb5_tfms[usage_slot],
sgt.sgl, sgt.nents, &data_off, &data_len);
if (ret) {
pr_err("%s decrypt failed: %d\n", __func__, ret);
goto out_sgt;
}
WARN_ON(data_off != AES_BLOCK_SIZE);
*pout_len = data_len;
out_sgt:
teardown_sgtable(&sgt);
return ret;
}
int ceph_crypt(const struct ceph_crypto_key *key, int usage_slot, bool encrypt,
void *buf, int buf_len, int in_len, int *pout_len)
{
switch (key->type) {
case CEPH_CRYPTO_NONE:
*pout_len = in_len;
return 0;
case CEPH_CRYPTO_AES:
return ceph_aes_crypt(key, encrypt, buf, buf_len, in_len,
pout_len);
case CEPH_CRYPTO_AES256KRB5:
return encrypt ?
ceph_krb5_encrypt(key, usage_slot, buf, buf_len, in_len,
pout_len) :
ceph_krb5_decrypt(key, usage_slot, buf, buf_len, in_len,
pout_len);
default:
return -ENOTSUPP;
}
}
int ceph_crypt_data_offset(const struct ceph_crypto_key *key)
{
switch (key->type) {
case CEPH_CRYPTO_NONE:
case CEPH_CRYPTO_AES:
return 0;
case CEPH_CRYPTO_AES256KRB5:
/* confounder */
return AES_BLOCK_SIZE;
default:
BUG();
}
}
int ceph_crypt_buflen(const struct ceph_crypto_key *key, int data_len)
{
switch (key->type) {
case CEPH_CRYPTO_NONE:
return data_len;
case CEPH_CRYPTO_AES:
/* PKCS#7 padding at the end */
return data_len + AES_BLOCK_SIZE -
(data_len & (AES_BLOCK_SIZE - 1));
case CEPH_CRYPTO_AES256KRB5:
/* confounder at the beginning and 192-bit HMAC at the end */
return AES_BLOCK_SIZE + data_len + 24;
default:
BUG();
}
}
void ceph_hmac_sha256(const struct ceph_crypto_key *key, const void *buf,
int buf_len, u8 hmac[SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE])
{
switch (key->type) {
case CEPH_CRYPTO_NONE:
case CEPH_CRYPTO_AES:
memset(hmac, 0, SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE);
return;
case CEPH_CRYPTO_AES256KRB5:
hmac_sha256(&key->hmac_key, buf, buf_len, hmac);
return;
default:
BUG();
}
}
static int ceph_key_preparse(struct key_preparsed_payload *prep)
{
struct ceph_crypto_key *ckey;
size_t datalen = prep->datalen;
int ret;
void *p;
ret = -EINVAL;
if (datalen <= 0 || datalen > 32767 || !prep->data)
goto err;
ret = -ENOMEM;
ckey = kzalloc_obj(*ckey);
if (!ckey)
goto err;
/* TODO ceph_crypto_key_decode should really take const input */
p = (void *)prep->data;
ret = ceph_crypto_key_decode(ckey, &p, (char*)prep->data+datalen);
if (ret < 0)
goto err_ckey;
prep->payload.data[0] = ckey;
prep->quotalen = datalen;
return 0;
err_ckey:
kfree(ckey);
err:
return ret;
}
static void ceph_key_free_preparse(struct key_preparsed_payload *prep)
{
struct ceph_crypto_key *ckey = prep->payload.data[0];
ceph_crypto_key_destroy(ckey);
kfree(ckey);
}
static void ceph_key_destroy(struct key *key)
{
struct ceph_crypto_key *ckey = key->payload.data[0];
ceph_crypto_key_destroy(ckey);
kfree(ckey);
}
struct key_type key_type_ceph = {
.name = "ceph",
.preparse = ceph_key_preparse,
.free_preparse = ceph_key_free_preparse,
.instantiate = generic_key_instantiate,
.destroy = ceph_key_destroy,
};
int __init ceph_crypto_init(void)
{
return register_key_type(&key_type_ceph);
}
void ceph_crypto_shutdown(void)
{
unregister_key_type(&key_type_ceph);
}