linux/fs/verity/fsverity_private.h
Linus Torvalds 45a43ac5ac vfs-7.0-rc1.misc.2
Please consider pulling these changes from the signed vfs-7.0-rc1.misc.2 tag.
 
 Thanks!
 Christian
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Merge tag 'vfs-7.0-rc1.misc.2' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/vfs/vfs

Pull more misc vfs updates from Christian Brauner:
 "Features:

   - Optimize close_range() from O(range size) to O(active FDs) by using
     find_next_bit() on the open_fds bitmap instead of linearly scanning
     the entire requested range. This is a significant improvement for
     large-range close operations on sparse file descriptor tables.

   - Add FS_XFLAG_VERITY file attribute for fs-verity files, retrievable
     via FS_IOC_FSGETXATTR and file_getattr(). The flag is read-only.
     Add tracepoints for fs-verity enable and verify operations,
     replacing the previously removed debug printk's.

   - Prevent nfsd from exporting special kernel filesystems like pidfs
     and nsfs. These filesystems have custom ->open() and ->permission()
     export methods that are designed for open_by_handle_at(2) only and
     are incompatible with nfsd. Update the exportfs documentation
     accordingly.

  Fixes:

   - Fix KMSAN uninit-value in ovl_fill_real() where strcmp() was used
     on a non-null-terminated decrypted directory entry name from
     fscrypt. This triggered on encrypted lower layers when the
     decrypted name buffer contained uninitialized tail data.

     The fix also adds VFS-level name_is_dot(), name_is_dotdot(), and
     name_is_dot_dotdot() helpers, replacing various open-coded "." and
     ".." checks across the tree.

   - Fix read-only fsflags not being reset together with xflags in
     vfs_fileattr_set(). Currently harmless since no read-only xflags
     overlap with flags, but this would cause inconsistencies for any
     future shared read-only flag

   - Return -EREMOTE instead of -ESRCH from PIDFD_GET_INFO when the
     target process is in a different pid namespace. This lets userspace
     distinguish "process exited" from "process in another namespace",
     matching glibc's pidfd_getpid() behavior

  Cleanups:

   - Use C-string literals in the Rust seq_file bindings, replacing the
     kernel::c_str!() macro (available since Rust 1.77)

   - Fix typo in d_walk_ret enum comment, add porting notes for the
     readlink_copy() calling convention change"

* tag 'vfs-7.0-rc1.misc.2' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/vfs/vfs:
  fs: add porting notes about readlink_copy()
  pidfs: return -EREMOTE when PIDFD_GET_INFO is called on another ns
  nfsd: do not allow exporting of special kernel filesystems
  exportfs: clarify the documentation of open()/permission() expotrfs ops
  fsverity: add tracepoints
  fs: add FS_XFLAG_VERITY for fs-verity files
  rust: seq_file: replace `kernel::c_str!` with C-Strings
  fs: dcache: fix typo in enum d_walk_ret comment
  ovl: use name_is_dot* helpers in readdir code
  fs: add helpers name_is_dot{,dot,_dotdot}
  ovl: Fix uninit-value in ovl_fill_real
  fs: reset read-only fsflags together with xflags
  fs/file: optimize close_range() complexity from O(N) to O(Sparse)
2026-02-16 13:00:36 -08:00

168 lines
5.2 KiB
C

/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */
/*
* fs-verity: read-only file-based authenticity protection
*
* Copyright 2019 Google LLC
*/
#ifndef _FSVERITY_PRIVATE_H
#define _FSVERITY_PRIVATE_H
#define pr_fmt(fmt) "fs-verity: " fmt
#include <linux/fsverity.h>
#include <linux/rhashtable.h>
/*
* Implementation limit: maximum depth of the Merkle tree. For now 8 is plenty;
* it's enough for over U64_MAX bytes of data using SHA-256 and 4K blocks.
*/
#define FS_VERITY_MAX_LEVELS 8
/* A hash algorithm supported by fs-verity */
struct fsverity_hash_alg {
const char *name; /* crypto API name, e.g. sha256 */
unsigned int digest_size; /* digest size in bytes, e.g. 32 for SHA-256 */
unsigned int block_size; /* block size in bytes, e.g. 64 for SHA-256 */
/*
* The HASH_ALGO_* constant for this algorithm. This is different from
* FS_VERITY_HASH_ALG_*, which uses a different numbering scheme.
*/
enum hash_algo algo_id;
};
union fsverity_hash_ctx {
struct sha256_ctx sha256;
struct sha512_ctx sha512;
};
/* Merkle tree parameters: hash algorithm, initial hash state, and topology */
struct merkle_tree_params {
const struct fsverity_hash_alg *hash_alg; /* the hash algorithm */
/* initial hash state if salted, NULL if unsalted */
const union fsverity_hash_ctx *hashstate;
unsigned int digest_size; /* same as hash_alg->digest_size */
unsigned int block_size; /* size of data and tree blocks */
unsigned int hashes_per_block; /* number of hashes per tree block */
unsigned int blocks_per_page; /* PAGE_SIZE / block_size */
u8 log_digestsize; /* log2(digest_size) */
u8 log_blocksize; /* log2(block_size) */
u8 log_arity; /* log2(hashes_per_block) */
u8 log_blocks_per_page; /* log2(blocks_per_page) */
unsigned int num_levels; /* number of levels in Merkle tree */
u64 tree_size; /* Merkle tree size in bytes */
unsigned long tree_pages; /* Merkle tree size in pages */
/*
* Starting block index for each tree level, ordered from leaf level (0)
* to root level ('num_levels - 1')
*/
unsigned long level_start[FS_VERITY_MAX_LEVELS];
};
/*
* fsverity_info - cached verity metadata for an inode
*
* When a verity file is first opened, an instance of this struct is allocated
* and a pointer to it is stored in the global hash table, indexed by the inode
* pointer value. It remains alive until the inode is evicted. It caches
* information about the Merkle tree that's needed to efficiently verify data
* read from the file. It also caches the file digest. The Merkle tree pages
* themselves are not cached here, but the filesystem may cache them.
*/
struct fsverity_info {
struct rhash_head rhash_head;
struct merkle_tree_params tree_params;
u8 root_hash[FS_VERITY_MAX_DIGEST_SIZE];
u8 file_digest[FS_VERITY_MAX_DIGEST_SIZE];
struct inode *inode;
unsigned long *hash_block_verified;
};
#define FS_VERITY_MAX_SIGNATURE_SIZE (FS_VERITY_MAX_DESCRIPTOR_SIZE - \
sizeof(struct fsverity_descriptor))
/* hash_algs.c */
extern const struct fsverity_hash_alg fsverity_hash_algs[];
const struct fsverity_hash_alg *fsverity_get_hash_alg(const struct inode *inode,
unsigned int num);
union fsverity_hash_ctx *
fsverity_prepare_hash_state(const struct fsverity_hash_alg *alg,
const u8 *salt, size_t salt_size);
void fsverity_hash_block(const struct merkle_tree_params *params,
const void *data, u8 *out);
void fsverity_hash_buffer(const struct fsverity_hash_alg *alg,
const void *data, size_t size, u8 *out);
void __init fsverity_check_hash_algs(void);
/* init.c */
void __printf(3, 4) __cold
fsverity_msg(const struct inode *inode, const char *level,
const char *fmt, ...);
#define fsverity_warn(inode, fmt, ...) \
fsverity_msg((inode), KERN_WARNING, fmt, ##__VA_ARGS__)
#define fsverity_err(inode, fmt, ...) \
fsverity_msg((inode), KERN_ERR, fmt, ##__VA_ARGS__)
/* measure.c */
#ifdef CONFIG_BPF_SYSCALL
void __init fsverity_init_bpf(void);
#else
static inline void fsverity_init_bpf(void)
{
}
#endif
/* open.c */
int fsverity_init_merkle_tree_params(struct merkle_tree_params *params,
const struct inode *inode,
unsigned int hash_algorithm,
unsigned int log_blocksize,
const u8 *salt, size_t salt_size);
struct fsverity_info *fsverity_create_info(struct inode *inode,
struct fsverity_descriptor *desc);
int fsverity_set_info(struct fsverity_info *vi);
void fsverity_free_info(struct fsverity_info *vi);
void fsverity_remove_info(struct fsverity_info *vi);
int fsverity_get_descriptor(struct inode *inode,
struct fsverity_descriptor **desc_ret);
void __init fsverity_init_info_cache(void);
/* signature.c */
#ifdef CONFIG_FS_VERITY_BUILTIN_SIGNATURES
extern int fsverity_require_signatures;
int fsverity_verify_signature(const struct fsverity_info *vi,
const u8 *signature, size_t sig_size);
void __init fsverity_init_signature(void);
#else /* !CONFIG_FS_VERITY_BUILTIN_SIGNATURES */
static inline int
fsverity_verify_signature(const struct fsverity_info *vi,
const u8 *signature, size_t sig_size)
{
return 0;
}
static inline void fsverity_init_signature(void)
{
}
#endif /* !CONFIG_FS_VERITY_BUILTIN_SIGNATURES */
/* verify.c */
void __init fsverity_init_workqueue(void);
#include <trace/events/fsverity.h>
#endif /* _FSVERITY_PRIVATE_H */