linux/drivers/md/dm-verity-verify-sig.c
Mikulas Patocka 0f1e16b3a8 dm-verity: fix section mismatch error
The function "__init dm_verity_init" was calling "__exit
dm_verity_verify_sig_exit" and this triggered section mismatch error.

Fix this by dropping the "__exit" tag on dm_verity_verify_sig_exit.

Signed-off-by: Mikulas Patocka <mpatocka@redhat.com>
Fixes: 033724b1c627A ("dm-verity: add dm-verity keyring")
Reported-by: kernel test robot <lkp@intel.com>
Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/oe-kbuild-all/202601210645.11u5Myme-lkp@intel.com/
Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/oe-kbuild-all/202601211041.pcTzwcdp-lkp@intel.com/
2026-01-21 14:06:23 +01:00

199 lines
4.9 KiB
C

// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only
/*
* Copyright (C) 2019 Microsoft Corporation.
*
* Author: Jaskaran Singh Khurana <jaskarankhurana@linux.microsoft.com>
*
*/
#include <linux/device-mapper.h>
#include <linux/verification.h>
#include <linux/key.h>
#include <keys/user-type.h>
#include <linux/module.h>
#include "dm-verity.h"
#include "dm-verity-verify-sig.h"
#define DM_VERITY_VERIFY_ERR(s) DM_VERITY_ROOT_HASH_VERIFICATION " " s
static struct key *dm_verity_keyring;
static bool dm_verity_keyring_unsealed __ro_after_init;
module_param_named(keyring_unsealed, dm_verity_keyring_unsealed, bool, 0444);
MODULE_PARM_DESC(keyring_unsealed, "Leave the dm-verity keyring unsealed");
static bool require_signatures;
module_param(require_signatures, bool, 0444);
MODULE_PARM_DESC(require_signatures,
"Verify the roothash of dm-verity hash tree");
#define DM_VERITY_IS_SIG_FORCE_ENABLED() \
(require_signatures != false)
bool verity_verify_is_sig_opt_arg(const char *arg_name)
{
return (!strcasecmp(arg_name,
DM_VERITY_ROOT_HASH_VERIFICATION_OPT_SIG_KEY));
}
static int verity_verify_get_sig_from_key(const char *key_desc,
struct dm_verity_sig_opts *sig_opts)
{
struct key *key;
const struct user_key_payload *ukp;
int ret = 0;
key = request_key(&key_type_user,
key_desc, NULL);
if (IS_ERR(key))
return PTR_ERR(key);
down_read(&key->sem);
ukp = user_key_payload_locked(key);
if (!ukp) {
ret = -EKEYREVOKED;
goto end;
}
sig_opts->sig = kmalloc(ukp->datalen, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!sig_opts->sig) {
ret = -ENOMEM;
goto end;
}
sig_opts->sig_size = ukp->datalen;
memcpy(sig_opts->sig, ukp->data, sig_opts->sig_size);
end:
up_read(&key->sem);
key_put(key);
return ret;
}
int verity_verify_sig_parse_opt_args(struct dm_arg_set *as,
struct dm_verity *v,
struct dm_verity_sig_opts *sig_opts,
unsigned int *argc,
const char *arg_name)
{
struct dm_target *ti = v->ti;
int ret;
const char *sig_key = NULL;
if (v->signature_key_desc) {
ti->error = DM_VERITY_VERIFY_ERR("root_hash_sig_key_desc already specified");
return -EINVAL;
}
if (!*argc) {
ti->error = DM_VERITY_VERIFY_ERR("Signature key not specified");
return -EINVAL;
}
sig_key = dm_shift_arg(as);
(*argc)--;
ret = verity_verify_get_sig_from_key(sig_key, sig_opts);
if (ret < 0) {
ti->error = DM_VERITY_VERIFY_ERR("Invalid key specified");
return ret;
}
v->signature_key_desc = kstrdup(sig_key, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!v->signature_key_desc) {
ti->error = DM_VERITY_VERIFY_ERR("Could not allocate memory for signature key");
return -ENOMEM;
}
return 0;
}
/*
* verify_verify_roothash - Verify the root hash of the verity hash device
* using builtin trusted keys.
*
* @root_hash: For verity, the roothash/data to be verified.
* @root_hash_len: Size of the roothash/data to be verified.
* @sig_data: The trusted signature that verifies the roothash/data.
* @sig_len: Size of the signature.
*
*/
int verity_verify_root_hash(const void *root_hash, size_t root_hash_len,
const void *sig_data, size_t sig_len)
{
int ret;
if (!root_hash || root_hash_len == 0)
return -EINVAL;
if (!sig_data || sig_len == 0) {
if (DM_VERITY_IS_SIG_FORCE_ENABLED())
return -ENOKEY;
else
return 0;
}
ret = verify_pkcs7_signature(root_hash, root_hash_len, sig_data,
sig_len,
#ifdef CONFIG_DM_VERITY_VERIFY_ROOTHASH_SIG_SECONDARY_KEYRING
VERIFY_USE_SECONDARY_KEYRING,
#else
NULL,
#endif
VERIFYING_UNSPECIFIED_SIGNATURE, NULL, NULL);
#ifdef CONFIG_DM_VERITY_VERIFY_ROOTHASH_SIG_PLATFORM_KEYRING
if (ret == -ENOKEY || ret == -EKEYREJECTED)
ret = verify_pkcs7_signature(root_hash, root_hash_len, sig_data,
sig_len,
VERIFY_USE_PLATFORM_KEYRING,
VERIFYING_UNSPECIFIED_SIGNATURE, NULL, NULL);
#endif
if (ret != -ENOKEY && ret != -EKEYREJECTED)
return ret;
if (dm_verity_keyring->keys.nr_leaves_on_tree &&
dm_verity_keyring->restrict_link)
ret = verify_pkcs7_signature(root_hash, root_hash_len,
sig_data, sig_len,
dm_verity_keyring,
VERIFYING_UNSPECIFIED_SIGNATURE,
NULL, NULL);
return ret;
}
void verity_verify_sig_opts_cleanup(struct dm_verity_sig_opts *sig_opts)
{
kfree(sig_opts->sig);
sig_opts->sig = NULL;
sig_opts->sig_size = 0;
}
int __init dm_verity_verify_sig_init(void)
{
dm_verity_keyring = keyring_alloc(".dm-verity",
GLOBAL_ROOT_UID, GLOBAL_ROOT_GID,
current_cred(),
KEY_POS_SEARCH |
KEY_USR_VIEW | KEY_USR_READ |
KEY_USR_WRITE | KEY_USR_SEARCH |
KEY_USR_SETATTR,
KEY_ALLOC_NOT_IN_QUOTA,
NULL, NULL);
if (IS_ERR(dm_verity_keyring))
panic("dm-verity can't allocate keyring\n");
if (!dm_verity_keyring_unsealed &&
keyring_restrict(make_key_ref(dm_verity_keyring, true), NULL, NULL))
panic("dm-verity can't seal keyring\n");
return 0;
}
void dm_verity_verify_sig_exit(void)
{
key_revoke(dm_verity_keyring);
key_put(dm_verity_keyring);
}