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Add a kernel command line option to disable part or all of user CFI. User backward CFI and forward CFI can be controlled independently. The kernel command line parameter "riscv_nousercfi" can take the following values: - "all" : Disable forward and backward cfi both - "bcfi" : Disable backward cfi - "fcfi" : Disable forward cfi Signed-off-by: Deepak Gupta <debug@rivosinc.com> Tested-by: Andreas Korb <andreas.korb@aisec.fraunhofer.de> # QEMU, custom CVA6 Tested-by: Valentin Haudiquet <valentin.haudiquet@canonical.com> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20251112-v5_user_cfi_series-v23-21-b55691eacf4f@rivosinc.com [pjw@kernel.org: fixed warnings from checkpatch; cleaned up patch description, doc, printk text] Signed-off-by: Paul Walmsley <pjw@kernel.org>
542 lines
15 KiB
C
542 lines
15 KiB
C
// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
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/*
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* Copyright (C) 2024 Rivos, Inc.
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* Deepak Gupta <debug@rivosinc.com>
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*/
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#include <linux/sched.h>
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#include <linux/bitops.h>
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#include <linux/types.h>
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#include <linux/mm.h>
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#include <linux/mman.h>
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#include <linux/uaccess.h>
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#include <linux/sizes.h>
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#include <linux/user.h>
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#include <linux/syscalls.h>
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#include <linux/prctl.h>
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#include <asm/csr.h>
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#include <asm/usercfi.h>
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unsigned long riscv_nousercfi __read_mostly;
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#define SHSTK_ENTRY_SIZE sizeof(void *)
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bool is_shstk_enabled(struct task_struct *task)
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{
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return task->thread_info.user_cfi_state.ubcfi_en;
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}
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bool is_shstk_allocated(struct task_struct *task)
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{
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return task->thread_info.user_cfi_state.shdw_stk_base;
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}
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bool is_shstk_locked(struct task_struct *task)
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{
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return task->thread_info.user_cfi_state.ubcfi_locked;
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}
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void set_shstk_base(struct task_struct *task, unsigned long shstk_addr, unsigned long size)
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{
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task->thread_info.user_cfi_state.shdw_stk_base = shstk_addr;
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task->thread_info.user_cfi_state.shdw_stk_size = size;
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}
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unsigned long get_shstk_base(struct task_struct *task, unsigned long *size)
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{
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if (size)
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*size = task->thread_info.user_cfi_state.shdw_stk_size;
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return task->thread_info.user_cfi_state.shdw_stk_base;
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}
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void set_active_shstk(struct task_struct *task, unsigned long shstk_addr)
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{
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task->thread_info.user_cfi_state.user_shdw_stk = shstk_addr;
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}
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unsigned long get_active_shstk(struct task_struct *task)
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{
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return task->thread_info.user_cfi_state.user_shdw_stk;
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}
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void set_shstk_status(struct task_struct *task, bool enable)
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{
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if (!is_user_shstk_enabled())
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return;
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task->thread_info.user_cfi_state.ubcfi_en = enable ? 1 : 0;
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if (enable)
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task->thread.envcfg |= ENVCFG_SSE;
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else
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task->thread.envcfg &= ~ENVCFG_SSE;
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csr_write(CSR_ENVCFG, task->thread.envcfg);
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}
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void set_shstk_lock(struct task_struct *task)
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{
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task->thread_info.user_cfi_state.ubcfi_locked = 1;
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}
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bool is_indir_lp_enabled(struct task_struct *task)
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{
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return task->thread_info.user_cfi_state.ufcfi_en;
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}
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bool is_indir_lp_locked(struct task_struct *task)
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{
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return task->thread_info.user_cfi_state.ufcfi_locked;
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}
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void set_indir_lp_status(struct task_struct *task, bool enable)
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{
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if (!is_user_lpad_enabled())
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return;
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task->thread_info.user_cfi_state.ufcfi_en = enable ? 1 : 0;
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if (enable)
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task->thread.envcfg |= ENVCFG_LPE;
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else
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task->thread.envcfg &= ~ENVCFG_LPE;
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csr_write(CSR_ENVCFG, task->thread.envcfg);
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}
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void set_indir_lp_lock(struct task_struct *task)
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{
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task->thread_info.user_cfi_state.ufcfi_locked = 1;
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}
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/*
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* If size is 0, then to be compatible with regular stack we want it to be as big as
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* regular stack. Else PAGE_ALIGN it and return back
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*/
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static unsigned long calc_shstk_size(unsigned long size)
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{
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if (size)
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return PAGE_ALIGN(size);
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return PAGE_ALIGN(min_t(unsigned long long, rlimit(RLIMIT_STACK), SZ_4G));
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}
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/*
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* Writes on shadow stack can either be `sspush` or `ssamoswap`. `sspush` can happen
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* implicitly on current shadow stack pointed to by CSR_SSP. `ssamoswap` takes pointer to
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* shadow stack. To keep it simple, we plan to use `ssamoswap` to perform writes on shadow
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* stack.
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*/
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static noinline unsigned long amo_user_shstk(unsigned long __user *addr, unsigned long val)
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{
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/*
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* Never expect -1 on shadow stack. Expect return addresses and zero
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*/
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unsigned long swap = -1;
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__enable_user_access();
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asm goto(".option push\n"
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".option arch, +zicfiss\n"
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"1: ssamoswap.d %[swap], %[val], %[addr]\n"
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_ASM_EXTABLE(1b, %l[fault])
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".option pop\n"
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: [swap] "=r" (swap), [addr] "+A" (*(__force unsigned long *)addr)
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: [val] "r" (val)
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: "memory"
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: fault
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);
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__disable_user_access();
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return swap;
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fault:
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__disable_user_access();
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return -1;
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}
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/*
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* Create a restore token on the shadow stack. A token is always XLEN wide
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* and aligned to XLEN.
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*/
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static int create_rstor_token(unsigned long ssp, unsigned long *token_addr)
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{
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unsigned long addr;
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/* Token must be aligned */
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if (!IS_ALIGNED(ssp, SHSTK_ENTRY_SIZE))
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return -EINVAL;
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/* On RISC-V we're constructing token to be function of address itself */
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addr = ssp - SHSTK_ENTRY_SIZE;
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if (amo_user_shstk((unsigned long __user *)addr, (unsigned long)ssp) == -1)
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return -EFAULT;
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if (token_addr)
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*token_addr = addr;
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return 0;
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}
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/*
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* Save user shadow stack pointer on the shadow stack itself and return a pointer to saved location.
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* Returns -EFAULT if unsuccessful.
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*/
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int save_user_shstk(struct task_struct *tsk, unsigned long *saved_shstk_ptr)
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{
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unsigned long ss_ptr = 0;
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unsigned long token_loc = 0;
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int ret = 0;
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if (!saved_shstk_ptr)
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return -EINVAL;
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ss_ptr = get_active_shstk(tsk);
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ret = create_rstor_token(ss_ptr, &token_loc);
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if (!ret) {
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*saved_shstk_ptr = token_loc;
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set_active_shstk(tsk, token_loc);
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}
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return ret;
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}
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/*
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* Restores the user shadow stack pointer from the token on the shadow stack for task 'tsk'.
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* Returns -EFAULT if unsuccessful.
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*/
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int restore_user_shstk(struct task_struct *tsk, unsigned long shstk_ptr)
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{
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unsigned long token = 0;
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token = amo_user_shstk((unsigned long __user *)shstk_ptr, 0);
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if (token == -1)
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return -EFAULT;
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/* invalid token, return EINVAL */
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if ((token - shstk_ptr) != SHSTK_ENTRY_SIZE) {
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pr_info_ratelimited("%s[%d]: bad restore token in %s: pc=%p sp=%p, token=%p, shstk_ptr=%p\n",
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tsk->comm, task_pid_nr(tsk), __func__,
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(void *)(task_pt_regs(tsk)->epc),
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(void *)(task_pt_regs(tsk)->sp),
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(void *)token, (void *)shstk_ptr);
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return -EINVAL;
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}
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/* all checks passed, set active shstk and return success */
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set_active_shstk(tsk, token);
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return 0;
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}
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static unsigned long allocate_shadow_stack(unsigned long addr, unsigned long size,
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unsigned long token_offset, bool set_tok)
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{
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int flags = MAP_ANONYMOUS | MAP_PRIVATE;
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struct mm_struct *mm = current->mm;
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unsigned long populate;
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if (addr)
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flags |= MAP_FIXED_NOREPLACE;
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mmap_write_lock(mm);
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addr = do_mmap(NULL, addr, size, PROT_READ, flags,
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VM_SHADOW_STACK | VM_WRITE, 0, &populate, NULL);
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mmap_write_unlock(mm);
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if (!set_tok || IS_ERR_VALUE(addr))
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goto out;
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if (create_rstor_token(addr + token_offset, NULL)) {
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vm_munmap(addr, size);
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return -EINVAL;
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}
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out:
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return addr;
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}
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SYSCALL_DEFINE3(map_shadow_stack, unsigned long, addr, unsigned long, size, unsigned int, flags)
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{
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bool set_tok = flags & SHADOW_STACK_SET_TOKEN;
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unsigned long aligned_size = 0;
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if (!is_user_shstk_enabled())
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return -EOPNOTSUPP;
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/* Anything other than set token should result in invalid param */
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if (flags & ~SHADOW_STACK_SET_TOKEN)
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return -EINVAL;
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/*
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* Unlike other architectures, on RISC-V, SSP pointer is held in CSR_SSP and is an available
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* CSR in all modes. CSR accesses are performed using 12bit index programmed in instruction
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* itself. This provides static property on register programming and writes to CSR can't
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* be unintentional from programmer's perspective. As long as programmer has guarded areas
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* which perform writes to CSR_SSP properly, shadow stack pivoting is not possible. Since
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* CSR_SSP is writable by user mode, it itself can setup a shadow stack token subsequent
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* to allocation. Although in order to provide portablity with other architectures (because
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* `map_shadow_stack` is arch agnostic syscall), RISC-V will follow expectation of a token
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* flag in flags and if provided in flags, will setup a token at the base.
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*/
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/* If there isn't space for a token */
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if (set_tok && size < SHSTK_ENTRY_SIZE)
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return -ENOSPC;
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if (addr && (addr & (PAGE_SIZE - 1)))
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return -EINVAL;
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aligned_size = PAGE_ALIGN(size);
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if (aligned_size < size)
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return -EOVERFLOW;
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return allocate_shadow_stack(addr, aligned_size, size, set_tok);
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}
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/*
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* This gets called during clone/clone3/fork. And is needed to allocate a shadow stack for
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* cases where CLONE_VM is specified and thus a different stack is specified by user. We
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* thus need a separate shadow stack too. How a separate shadow stack is specified by
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* user is still being debated. Once that's settled, remove this part of the comment.
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* This function simply returns 0 if shadow stacks are not supported or if separate shadow
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* stack allocation is not needed (like in case of !CLONE_VM)
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*/
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unsigned long shstk_alloc_thread_stack(struct task_struct *tsk,
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const struct kernel_clone_args *args)
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{
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unsigned long addr, size;
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/* If shadow stack is not supported, return 0 */
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if (!is_user_shstk_enabled())
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return 0;
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/*
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* If shadow stack is not enabled on the new thread, skip any
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* switch to a new shadow stack.
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*/
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if (!is_shstk_enabled(tsk))
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return 0;
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/*
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* For CLONE_VFORK the child will share the parents shadow stack.
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* Set base = 0 and size = 0, this is special means to track this state
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* so the freeing logic run for child knows to leave it alone.
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*/
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if (args->flags & CLONE_VFORK) {
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set_shstk_base(tsk, 0, 0);
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return 0;
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}
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/*
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* For !CLONE_VM the child will use a copy of the parents shadow
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* stack.
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*/
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if (!(args->flags & CLONE_VM))
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return 0;
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/*
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* reaching here means, CLONE_VM was specified and thus a separate shadow
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* stack is needed for new cloned thread. Note: below allocation is happening
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* using current mm.
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*/
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size = calc_shstk_size(args->stack_size);
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addr = allocate_shadow_stack(0, size, 0, false);
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if (IS_ERR_VALUE(addr))
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return addr;
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set_shstk_base(tsk, addr, size);
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return addr + size;
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}
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void shstk_release(struct task_struct *tsk)
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{
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unsigned long base = 0, size = 0;
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/* If shadow stack is not supported or not enabled, nothing to release */
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if (!is_user_shstk_enabled() || !is_shstk_enabled(tsk))
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return;
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/*
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* When fork() with CLONE_VM fails, the child (tsk) already has a
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* shadow stack allocated, and exit_thread() calls this function to
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* free it. In this case the parent (current) and the child share
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* the same mm struct. Move forward only when they're same.
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*/
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if (!tsk->mm || tsk->mm != current->mm)
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return;
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/*
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* We know shadow stack is enabled but if base is NULL, then
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* this task is not managing its own shadow stack (CLONE_VFORK). So
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* skip freeing it.
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*/
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base = get_shstk_base(tsk, &size);
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if (!base)
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return;
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vm_munmap(base, size);
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set_shstk_base(tsk, 0, 0);
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}
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int arch_get_shadow_stack_status(struct task_struct *t, unsigned long __user *status)
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{
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unsigned long bcfi_status = 0;
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if (!is_user_shstk_enabled())
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return -EINVAL;
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/* this means shadow stack is enabled on the task */
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bcfi_status |= (is_shstk_enabled(t) ? PR_SHADOW_STACK_ENABLE : 0);
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return copy_to_user(status, &bcfi_status, sizeof(bcfi_status)) ? -EFAULT : 0;
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}
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int arch_set_shadow_stack_status(struct task_struct *t, unsigned long status)
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{
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unsigned long size = 0, addr = 0;
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bool enable_shstk = false;
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if (!is_user_shstk_enabled())
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return -EINVAL;
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/* Reject unknown flags */
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if (status & ~PR_SHADOW_STACK_SUPPORTED_STATUS_MASK)
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return -EINVAL;
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/* bcfi status is locked and further can't be modified by user */
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if (is_shstk_locked(t))
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return -EINVAL;
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enable_shstk = status & PR_SHADOW_STACK_ENABLE;
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/* Request is to enable shadow stack and shadow stack is not enabled already */
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if (enable_shstk && !is_shstk_enabled(t)) {
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/* shadow stack was allocated and enable request again
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* no need to support such usecase and return EINVAL.
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*/
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if (is_shstk_allocated(t))
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return -EINVAL;
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size = calc_shstk_size(0);
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addr = allocate_shadow_stack(0, size, 0, false);
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if (IS_ERR_VALUE(addr))
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return -ENOMEM;
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set_shstk_base(t, addr, size);
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set_active_shstk(t, addr + size);
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}
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/*
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* If a request to disable shadow stack happens, let's go ahead and release it
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* Although, if CLONE_VFORKed child did this, then in that case we will end up
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* not releasing the shadow stack (because it might be needed in parent). Although
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* we will disable it for VFORKed child. And if VFORKed child tries to enable again
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* then in that case, it'll get entirely new shadow stack because following condition
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* are true
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* - shadow stack was not enabled for vforked child
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* - shadow stack base was anyways pointing to 0
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* This shouldn't be a big issue because we want parent to have availability of shadow
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* stack whenever VFORKed child releases resources via exit or exec but at the same
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* time we want VFORKed child to break away and establish new shadow stack if it desires
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*
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*/
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if (!enable_shstk)
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shstk_release(t);
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set_shstk_status(t, enable_shstk);
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return 0;
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}
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int arch_lock_shadow_stack_status(struct task_struct *task,
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unsigned long arg)
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{
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/* If shtstk not supported or not enabled on task, nothing to lock here */
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if (!is_user_shstk_enabled() ||
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!is_shstk_enabled(task) || arg != 0)
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return -EINVAL;
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set_shstk_lock(task);
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return 0;
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}
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int arch_get_indir_br_lp_status(struct task_struct *t, unsigned long __user *status)
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{
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unsigned long fcfi_status = 0;
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if (!is_user_lpad_enabled())
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return -EINVAL;
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/* indirect branch tracking is enabled on the task or not */
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fcfi_status |= (is_indir_lp_enabled(t) ? PR_INDIR_BR_LP_ENABLE : 0);
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return copy_to_user(status, &fcfi_status, sizeof(fcfi_status)) ? -EFAULT : 0;
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}
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int arch_set_indir_br_lp_status(struct task_struct *t, unsigned long status)
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{
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bool enable_indir_lp = false;
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if (!is_user_lpad_enabled())
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return -EINVAL;
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/* indirect branch tracking is locked and further can't be modified by user */
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if (is_indir_lp_locked(t))
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return -EINVAL;
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/* Reject unknown flags */
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if (status & ~PR_INDIR_BR_LP_ENABLE)
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return -EINVAL;
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enable_indir_lp = (status & PR_INDIR_BR_LP_ENABLE);
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set_indir_lp_status(t, enable_indir_lp);
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|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int arch_lock_indir_br_lp_status(struct task_struct *task,
|
|
unsigned long arg)
|
|
{
|
|
/*
|
|
* If indirect branch tracking is not supported or not enabled on task,
|
|
* nothing to lock here
|
|
*/
|
|
if (!is_user_lpad_enabled() ||
|
|
!is_indir_lp_enabled(task) || arg != 0)
|
|
return -EINVAL;
|
|
|
|
set_indir_lp_lock(task);
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
bool is_user_shstk_enabled(void)
|
|
{
|
|
return (cpu_supports_shadow_stack() &&
|
|
!(riscv_nousercfi & CMDLINE_DISABLE_RISCV_USERCFI_BCFI));
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
bool is_user_lpad_enabled(void)
|
|
{
|
|
return (cpu_supports_indirect_br_lp_instr() &&
|
|
!(riscv_nousercfi & CMDLINE_DISABLE_RISCV_USERCFI_FCFI));
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static int __init setup_global_riscv_enable(char *str)
|
|
{
|
|
if (strcmp(str, "all") == 0)
|
|
riscv_nousercfi = CMDLINE_DISABLE_RISCV_USERCFI;
|
|
|
|
if (strcmp(str, "fcfi") == 0)
|
|
riscv_nousercfi |= CMDLINE_DISABLE_RISCV_USERCFI_FCFI;
|
|
|
|
if (strcmp(str, "bcfi") == 0)
|
|
riscv_nousercfi |= CMDLINE_DISABLE_RISCV_USERCFI_BCFI;
|
|
|
|
if (riscv_nousercfi)
|
|
pr_info("RISC-V user CFI disabled via cmdline - shadow stack status : %s, landing pad status : %s\n",
|
|
(riscv_nousercfi & CMDLINE_DISABLE_RISCV_USERCFI_BCFI) ? "disabled" :
|
|
"enabled", (riscv_nousercfi & CMDLINE_DISABLE_RISCV_USERCFI_FCFI) ?
|
|
"disabled" : "enabled");
|
|
|
|
return 1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
__setup("riscv_nousercfi=", setup_global_riscv_enable);
|