Commit graph

8 commits

Author SHA1 Message Date
Kees Cook
69050f8d6d treewide: Replace kmalloc with kmalloc_obj for non-scalar types
This is the result of running the Coccinelle script from
scripts/coccinelle/api/kmalloc_objs.cocci. The script is designed to
avoid scalar types (which need careful case-by-case checking), and
instead replace kmalloc-family calls that allocate struct or union
object instances:

Single allocations:	kmalloc(sizeof(TYPE), ...)
are replaced with:	kmalloc_obj(TYPE, ...)

Array allocations:	kmalloc_array(COUNT, sizeof(TYPE), ...)
are replaced with:	kmalloc_objs(TYPE, COUNT, ...)

Flex array allocations:	kmalloc(struct_size(PTR, FAM, COUNT), ...)
are replaced with:	kmalloc_flex(*PTR, FAM, COUNT, ...)

(where TYPE may also be *VAR)

The resulting allocations no longer return "void *", instead returning
"TYPE *".

Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <kees@kernel.org>
2026-02-21 01:02:28 -08:00
Eduard Zingerman
e40f5a6bf8 bpf: correct stack liveness for tail calls
This updates bpf_insn_successors() reflecting that control flow might
jump over the instructions between tail call and function exit, verifier
might assume that some writes to parent stack always happen, which is
not the case.

Signed-off-by: Eduard Zingerman <eddyz87@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Martin Teichmann <martin.teichmann@xfel.eu>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20251119160355.1160932-4-martin.teichmann@xfel.eu
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
2025-11-21 17:45:30 -08:00
Anton Protopopov
493d9e0d60 bpf, x86: add support for indirect jumps
Add support for a new instruction

    BPF_JMP|BPF_X|BPF_JA, SRC=0, DST=Rx, off=0, imm=0

which does an indirect jump to a location stored in Rx.  The register
Rx should have type PTR_TO_INSN. This new type assures that the Rx
register contains a value (or a range of values) loaded from a
correct jump table – map of type instruction array.

For example, for a C switch LLVM will generate the following code:

    0:   r3 = r1                    # "switch (r3)"
    1:   if r3 > 0x13 goto +0x666   # check r3 boundaries
    2:   r3 <<= 0x3                 # adjust to an index in array of addresses
    3:   r1 = 0xbeef ll             # r1 is PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE, r1->map_ptr=M
    5:   r1 += r3                   # r1 inherits boundaries from r3
    6:   r1 = *(u64 *)(r1 + 0x0)    # r1 now has type INSN_TO_PTR
    7:   gotox r1                   # jit will generate proper code

Here the gotox instruction corresponds to one particular map. This is
possible however to have a gotox instruction which can be loaded from
different maps, e.g.

    0:   r1 &= 0x1
    1:   r2 <<= 0x3
    2:   r3 = 0x0 ll                # load from map M_1
    4:   r3 += r2
    5:   if r1 == 0x0 goto +0x4
    6:   r1 <<= 0x3
    7:   r3 = 0x0 ll                # load from map M_2
    9:   r3 += r1
    A:   r1 = *(u64 *)(r3 + 0x0)
    B:   gotox r1                   # jump to target loaded from M_1 or M_2

During check_cfg stage the verifier will collect all the maps which
point to inside the subprog being verified. When building the config,
the high 16 bytes of the insn_state are used, so this patch
(theoretically) supports jump tables of up to 2^16 slots.

During the later stage, in check_indirect_jump, it is checked that
the register Rx was loaded from a particular instruction array.

Signed-off-by: Anton Protopopov <a.s.protopopov@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Eduard Zingerman <eddyz87@gmail.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20251105090410.1250500-9-a.s.protopopov@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
2025-11-05 17:53:23 -08:00
Anton Protopopov
2f69c56854 bpf: make bpf_insn_successors to return a pointer
The bpf_insn_successors() function is used to return successors
to a BPF instruction. So far, an instruction could have 0, 1 or 2
successors. Prepare the verifier code to introduction of instructions
with more than 2 successors (namely, indirect jumps).

To do this, introduce a new struct, struct bpf_iarray, containing
an array of bpf instruction indexes and make bpf_insn_successors
to return a pointer of that type. The storage for all instructions
is allocated in the env->succ, which holds an array of size 2,
to be used for all instructions.

Signed-off-by: Anton Protopopov <a.s.protopopov@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Eduard Zingerman <eddyz87@gmail.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20251019202145.3944697-10-a.s.protopopov@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
2025-10-21 11:20:23 -07:00
Shardul Bankar
96d31dff3f bpf: Clarify get_outer_instance() handling in propagate_to_outer_instance()
propagate_to_outer_instance() calls get_outer_instance() and uses the
returned pointer to reset and commit stack write marks. Under normal
conditions, update_instance() guarantees that an outer instance exists,
so get_outer_instance() cannot return an ERR_PTR.

However, explicitly checking for IS_ERR(outer_instance) makes this code
more robust and self-documenting. It reduces cognitive load when reading
the control flow and silences potential false-positive reports from
static analysis or automated tooling.

No functional change intended.

Signed-off-by: Shardul Bankar <shardulsb08@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Eduard Zingerman <eddyz87@gmail.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20251021080849.860072-1-shardulsb08@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
2025-10-21 09:39:05 -07:00
Shardul Bankar
f6fddc6df3 bpf: Fix memory leak in __lookup_instance error path
When __lookup_instance() allocates a func_instance structure but fails
to allocate the must_write_set array, it returns an error without freeing
the previously allocated func_instance. This causes a memory leak of 192
bytes (sizeof(struct func_instance)) each time this error path is triggered.

Fix by freeing 'result' on must_write_set allocation failure.

Fixes: b3698c356a ("bpf: callchain sensitive stack liveness tracking using CFG")
Reported-by: BPF Runtime Fuzzer (BRF)
Signed-off-by: Shardul Bankar <shardulsb08@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Martin KaFai Lau <martin.lau@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Eduard Zingerman <eddyz87@gmail.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20251016063330.4107547-1-shardulsb08@gmail.com
2025-10-16 10:45:17 -07:00
Eduard Zingerman
79f047c7d9 bpf: table based bpf_insn_successors()
Converting bpf_insn_successors() to use lookup table makes it ~1.5
times faster.

Also remove unnecessary conditionals:
- `idx + 1 < prog->len` is unnecessary because after check_cfg() all
  jump targets are guaranteed to be within a program;
- `i == 0 || succ[0] != dst` is unnecessary because any client of
  bpf_insn_successors() can handle duplicate edges:
  - compute_live_registers()
  - compute_scc()

Moving bpf_insn_successors() to liveness.c allows its inlining in
liveness.c:__update_stack_liveness().
Such inlining speeds up __update_stack_liveness() by ~40%.
bpf_insn_successors() is used in both verifier.c and liveness.c.
perf shows such move does not negatively impact users in verifier.c,
as these are executed only once before main varification pass.
Unlike __update_stack_liveness() which can be triggered multiple
times.

Signed-off-by: Eduard Zingerman <eddyz87@gmail.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250918-callchain-sensitive-liveness-v3-10-c3cd27bacc60@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
2025-09-19 09:27:23 -07:00
Eduard Zingerman
b3698c356a bpf: callchain sensitive stack liveness tracking using CFG
This commit adds a flow-sensitive, context-sensitive, path-insensitive
data flow analysis for live stack slots:
- flow-sensitive: uses program control flow graph to compute data flow
  values;
- context-sensitive: collects data flow values for each possible call
  chain in a program;
- path-insensitive: does not distinguish between separate control flow
  graph paths reaching the same instruction.

Compared to the current path-sensitive analysis, this approach trades
some precision for not having to enumerate every path in the program.
This gives a theoretical capability to run the analysis before main
verification pass. See cover letter for motivation.

The basic idea is as follows:
- Data flow values indicate stack slots that might be read and stack
  slots that are definitely written.
- Data flow values are collected for each
  (call chain, instruction number) combination in the program.
- Within a subprogram, data flow values are propagated using control
  flow graph.
- Data flow values are transferred from entry instructions of callee
  subprograms to call sites in caller subprograms.

In other words, a tree of all possible call chains is constructed.
Each node of this tree represents a subprogram. Read and write marks
are collected for each instruction of each node. Live stack slots are
first computed for lower level nodes. Then, information about outer
stack slots that might be read or are definitely written by a
subprogram is propagated one level up, to the corresponding call
instructions of the upper nodes. Procedure repeats until root node is
processed.

In the absence of value range analysis, stack read/write marks are
collected during main verification pass, and data flow computation is
triggered each time verifier.c:states_equal() needs to query the
information.

Implementation details are documented in kernel/bpf/liveness.c.
Quantitative data about verification performance changes and memory
consumption is in the cover letter.

Signed-off-by: Eduard Zingerman <eddyz87@gmail.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250918-callchain-sensitive-liveness-v3-6-c3cd27bacc60@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
2025-09-19 09:27:23 -07:00