libceph: Use HMAC-SHA256 library instead of crypto_shash

Use the HMAC-SHA256 library functions instead of crypto_shash.  This is
simpler and faster.

Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Viacheslav Dubeyko <Slava.Dubeyko@ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Ilya Dryomov <idryomov@gmail.com>
This commit is contained in:
Eric Biggers 2025-07-31 12:02:27 -07:00 committed by Ilya Dryomov
parent e5f0a698b3
commit 27c0a7b05d
3 changed files with 26 additions and 58 deletions

View file

@ -2,6 +2,7 @@
#ifndef __FS_CEPH_MESSENGER_H
#define __FS_CEPH_MESSENGER_H
#include <crypto/sha2.h>
#include <linux/bvec.h>
#include <linux/crypto.h>
#include <linux/kref.h>
@ -412,7 +413,8 @@ struct ceph_connection_v2_info {
struct ceph_msg_data_cursor in_cursor;
struct ceph_msg_data_cursor out_cursor;
struct crypto_shash *hmac_tfm; /* post-auth signature */
struct hmac_sha256_key hmac_key; /* post-auth signature */
bool hmac_key_set;
struct crypto_aead *gcm_tfm; /* on-wire encryption */
struct aead_request *gcm_req;
struct crypto_wait gcm_wait;

View file

@ -6,8 +6,7 @@ config CEPH_LIB
select CRYPTO_AES
select CRYPTO_CBC
select CRYPTO_GCM
select CRYPTO_HMAC
select CRYPTO_SHA256
select CRYPTO_LIB_SHA256
select CRYPTO
select KEYS
default n

View file

@ -709,7 +709,7 @@ static int setup_crypto(struct ceph_connection *con,
dout("%s con %p con_mode %d session_key_len %d con_secret_len %d\n",
__func__, con, con->v2.con_mode, session_key_len, con_secret_len);
WARN_ON(con->v2.hmac_tfm || con->v2.gcm_tfm || con->v2.gcm_req);
WARN_ON(con->v2.hmac_key_set || con->v2.gcm_tfm || con->v2.gcm_req);
if (con->v2.con_mode != CEPH_CON_MODE_CRC &&
con->v2.con_mode != CEPH_CON_MODE_SECURE) {
@ -723,22 +723,8 @@ static int setup_crypto(struct ceph_connection *con,
return 0; /* auth_none */
}
noio_flag = memalloc_noio_save();
con->v2.hmac_tfm = crypto_alloc_shash("hmac(sha256)", 0, 0);
memalloc_noio_restore(noio_flag);
if (IS_ERR(con->v2.hmac_tfm)) {
ret = PTR_ERR(con->v2.hmac_tfm);
con->v2.hmac_tfm = NULL;
pr_err("failed to allocate hmac tfm context: %d\n", ret);
return ret;
}
ret = crypto_shash_setkey(con->v2.hmac_tfm, session_key,
session_key_len);
if (ret) {
pr_err("failed to set hmac key: %d\n", ret);
return ret;
}
hmac_sha256_preparekey(&con->v2.hmac_key, session_key, session_key_len);
con->v2.hmac_key_set = true;
if (con->v2.con_mode == CEPH_CON_MODE_CRC) {
WARN_ON(con_secret_len);
@ -793,38 +779,26 @@ static int setup_crypto(struct ceph_connection *con,
return 0; /* auth_x, secure mode */
}
static int ceph_hmac_sha256(struct ceph_connection *con,
const struct kvec *kvecs, int kvec_cnt, u8 *hmac)
static void ceph_hmac_sha256(struct ceph_connection *con,
const struct kvec *kvecs, int kvec_cnt,
u8 hmac[SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE])
{
SHASH_DESC_ON_STACK(desc, con->v2.hmac_tfm); /* tfm arg is ignored */
int ret;
struct hmac_sha256_ctx ctx;
int i;
dout("%s con %p hmac_tfm %p kvec_cnt %d\n", __func__, con,
con->v2.hmac_tfm, kvec_cnt);
dout("%s con %p hmac_key_set %d kvec_cnt %d\n", __func__, con,
con->v2.hmac_key_set, kvec_cnt);
if (!con->v2.hmac_tfm) {
if (!con->v2.hmac_key_set) {
memset(hmac, 0, SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE);
return 0; /* auth_none */
return; /* auth_none */
}
desc->tfm = con->v2.hmac_tfm;
ret = crypto_shash_init(desc);
if (ret)
goto out;
for (i = 0; i < kvec_cnt; i++) {
ret = crypto_shash_update(desc, kvecs[i].iov_base,
kvecs[i].iov_len);
if (ret)
goto out;
}
ret = crypto_shash_final(desc, hmac);
out:
shash_desc_zero(desc);
return ret; /* auth_x, both plain and secure modes */
/* auth_x, both plain and secure modes */
hmac_sha256_init(&ctx, &con->v2.hmac_key);
for (i = 0; i < kvec_cnt; i++)
hmac_sha256_update(&ctx, kvecs[i].iov_base, kvecs[i].iov_len);
hmac_sha256_final(&ctx, hmac);
}
static void gcm_inc_nonce(struct ceph_gcm_nonce *nonce)
@ -1455,17 +1429,14 @@ static int prepare_auth_request_more(struct ceph_connection *con,
static int prepare_auth_signature(struct ceph_connection *con)
{
void *buf;
int ret;
buf = alloc_conn_buf(con, head_onwire_len(SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE,
con_secure(con)));
if (!buf)
return -ENOMEM;
ret = ceph_hmac_sha256(con, con->v2.in_sign_kvecs,
con->v2.in_sign_kvec_cnt, CTRL_BODY(buf));
if (ret)
return ret;
ceph_hmac_sha256(con, con->v2.in_sign_kvecs, con->v2.in_sign_kvec_cnt,
CTRL_BODY(buf));
return prepare_control(con, FRAME_TAG_AUTH_SIGNATURE, buf,
SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE);
@ -2460,10 +2431,8 @@ static int process_auth_signature(struct ceph_connection *con,
return -EINVAL;
}
ret = ceph_hmac_sha256(con, con->v2.out_sign_kvecs,
con->v2.out_sign_kvec_cnt, hmac);
if (ret)
return ret;
ceph_hmac_sha256(con, con->v2.out_sign_kvecs, con->v2.out_sign_kvec_cnt,
hmac);
ceph_decode_need(&p, end, SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE, bad);
if (crypto_memneq(p, hmac, SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE)) {
@ -3814,10 +3783,8 @@ void ceph_con_v2_reset_protocol(struct ceph_connection *con)
memzero_explicit(&con->v2.in_gcm_nonce, CEPH_GCM_IV_LEN);
memzero_explicit(&con->v2.out_gcm_nonce, CEPH_GCM_IV_LEN);
if (con->v2.hmac_tfm) {
crypto_free_shash(con->v2.hmac_tfm);
con->v2.hmac_tfm = NULL;
}
memzero_explicit(&con->v2.hmac_key, sizeof(con->v2.hmac_key));
con->v2.hmac_key_set = false;
if (con->v2.gcm_req) {
aead_request_free(con->v2.gcm_req);
con->v2.gcm_req = NULL;